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Abstract
Many states have responded to mass influxes of refugees 
fleeing generalized violence and war by setting up ad hoc 
and/or temporary protection regimes. These regimes have 
had various degrees of success, depending particularly on 
the length of stay of the refugees. This article will compare 
the approach of states to three separate refugee influxes—
Kuwaiti refugees in the Gulf, Bosnian refugees in Germany, 
and Syrian refugees in Turkey—and will argue that efforts 
to harmonize temporary protection measures are desirable, 
but given that these situations tend to be prolonged, there 
must be greater responsibility sharing between states, in 
order to lead to greater integration of refugees in the host 
states.
Résumé
Un grand nombre d’États ont riposté aux afflux massifs 
de réfugiés fuyant la violence ou la guerre généralisée en 
mettant en place des régimes de protection spéciaux et/ou 
temporaires. Ces régimes ont été plus ou moins réussis, leur 
succès dépendant en particulier de la longueur du séjour des 
réfugiés. Cet article compare les approches étatiques devant 
trois afflux indépendants de réfugiés – réfugiés koweïtiens 
dans le Golfe, réfugiés bosniaques en Allemagne, et réfugiés 
syriens en Turquie – et affirme que des efforts d’harmonisa-
tion des mesures de protection temporaire sont souhaitables 
mais que, étant donné que les situations décrites ont ten-
dance à se prolonger, une plus grande responsabilité doit 
être assumée entre les états, pour parvenir à une meilleure 
intégration des réfugiés dans les États hôtes.
Introduction
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) has been ratified by over 140 states and provides protections and rights for those 
who are recognized as refugees under its definition. Who is 
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entitled to the protections provided in the convention can 
depend on a state’s interpretation of the convention’s defini-
tion of a refugee, and some states can be hesitant to grant ref-
ugee status under the convention when there is a mass influx 
of refugees.1 As the Syrian refugee crisis has shown, states 
have responded in a variety of ways: from providing the full 
protections of the 1951 Convention, to setting up ad hoc and/
or temporary protection regimes, to outright rejection.
Indeed, prior to the Refugee Convention, in treaties and 
arrangements concluded under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, a group or category approach was adopted to manage 
new refugee situations. The search for a definition was mainly 
in response to the large-scale Armenian and Jewish refugee 
crises in the 1900s.2 The 1938 Convention on German Refugees, 
in defining who fell under the provisions of the Convention, 
stated in article 1: “Persons possessing or having possessed 
German nationality and not possessing any other national-
ity who are proved not to enjoy, in law or fact, the protection 
of the German government.”3 The 1951 Refugee Convention, 
while being geographically and temporally bound at the time, 
included the definition of a refugee that was individualized 
as opposed to the previous group approach; in order to be 
considered a refugee, one had to show a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted on one of the five grounds enumerated 
in the convention.4 This excludes groups of people who flee 
generalized violence and war, especially if they have not been 
individually targeted for persecuted.
However, there was a need to continue with this “group” 
approach, even after the adoption of the Refugee Convention. 
In 1957 the UN General Assembly in UNGA resolution 1167 
first authorized the UNHCR to assist those who did not come 
fully within the statutory definition, but whose situation was 
“such as to be of concern to the international community.” 
Though clearly outside the time frames contained in the 1951 
Refugee Convention, the General Assembly also approved 
the UNHCR’s assistance to Algerian refugees in Morocco and 
Tunisia in 1958, and to the Chinese who fled to Hong Kong 
in 1959.5 Temporary rights to remain “are supported on the 
basis that groups of forced migrants have a prima facie claim 
to being in a ‘refugee-like’ situation.”6 Extensions of the 
UNHCR’s mandate do not seem to have altered or expanded 
the convention’s strict definition, because the assistance pro-
vided is qualitatively distinct from that given to “refugees” 
under the convention.7 Some regional human rights treaties, 
such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity’s Conven-
tion Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, offer a much more expansive definition of a refugee, 
including “every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturb-
ing public … is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place.”8 Indeed, 
Ethiopia and Uganda, both states parties to the convention, 
have adopted a generally open-door policy towards refugees 
and granted them prima facie refugee recognition.9
As the affliction of war has not left, some states have also 
adopted formal or informal temporary protection measures 
in response to influxes of refugees in modern times.10 There 
is great need for this, as some countries have not ratified the 
1951 Refugee Convention or regional treaties relating to refu-
gees, and others have been reluctant to apply the full protec-
tions of the Refugee Convention to large numbers of refu-
gees; indeed, temporary protection measures may encourage 
otherwise apprehensive states to take in larger numbers of 
refugees. 
However, these ad hoc protection regimes have had vary-
ing degrees of success, prompting the question, What works? 
And what factors contribute to the success or failure of these 
mechanisms? This article will compare the approach of 
states to three separate and very different refugee influxes—
Kuwaiti refugees in the Gulf, Bosnian refugees in Germany, 
and Syrian refugees in Turkey. These examples were chosen 
as they present varied ways—both formal and informal—of 
implementing a temporary protection regime and include 
both positive and negative aspects. Moreover, the case of 
Kuwaiti refugees has seldom been looked at in the literature. 
Thus, these cases may help provide suggestions for what can 
be implemented in the future, and what should be avoided, 
considering that mass influxes of people cannot be said to 
be a temporary phenomenon. While adopting minimum 
standards for states is desirable, issues arise when temporary 
situations are prolonged. In these cases, there must not only 
be harmonization of standards for minimum protection, 
but provisions for greater responsibility sharing between 
states, as well as greater freedoms for refugees, which will be 
detailed in the article.
What Is Temporary Protection? And What Can Be 
Considered a “Successful” Temporary Protection 
Regime?
There are several differences between temporary protection 
and the granting of refugee status. In order to qualify as a 
refugee under the convention, refugee status determination 
(RSD) would have to take place in order to ensure that the 
asylum seeker fulfills the refugee definition, which is usu-
ally a lengthy process. Moreover, while the definition may 
apply to groups of people who fit the convention’s definition, 
it becomes much more difficult in situations of mass influx 
of refugees.11 Hence it becomes easier to apply temporary 
protection to the entire group. Although not stated explicitly, 
the domestic policies of many states equate recognition as a 
refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention with a right to 
permanent residence.12 
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As a policy, “temporary protection” is more difficult to 
define, because it can involve and has involved legal and 
administrative changes in different countries that have 
adopted such measures and has also evolved in diverse 
ways.13 Nevertheless, there are some common features. 
Under the UNHCR’s guidelines, temporary protection “would 
be based on categories, groups or scenarios, allowing for a 
flexible and immediate response to … [a] crisis.”14 Indeed, 
temporary protection serves as “a short-term strategy to 
secure the immediate physical safety of refugees.”15 Tempo-
rary protection is usually also limited in time,16 although, as 
we will see with the example of Kuwaiti refugees in the Gulf 
and Syrian refugees in Turkey, time limits may not always be 
set. Other common features of temporary protection include 
the expectation—and occasional enforcement—of repatria-
tion once it is safe enough to return.17 However, according to 
the UNHCR’s guidelines, “in cases of extended stay, or where 
transition to solutions is delayed, the standards of treatment 
would need to be gradually improved.”18
Because temporary protection has been applied in very 
different ways, depending on the country, for the purposes 
of this article, temporary protection will have the following 
basic features: (1) permission to stay (2) for mass influxes 
of people (3) who have crossed an international border (4) 
fleeing generalized violence or war (5) for a certain period 
of time (whether stated explicitly or not)19 and (6) under 
arrangements outside of the 1951 Convention for those coun-
tries that have ratified it.
Furthermore, a successful temporary protection regime 
must also be defined. In essence, any response should ensure 
“full respect for international law and international human 
rights law”20 as affirmed in the 2016 New York Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants. Moreover, as also suggested by 
Ineli-Ciger, not only must temporary protection in particu-
lar not undermine customary and treaty-based human rights 
norms, these provisions should not undermine the 1951 Con-
vention in states that are party to the convention.21 Moreover, 
as suggested by the UNHCR’s Guidelines, the longer the stay, 
the greater the allowances that should be extended to the 
recipients of temporary protection, such as the permission 
to work, freedom of movement within the country, and the 
ability to pursue an education. This will help to avoid exploi-
tation, as we will see that difficulties in working for Syrians in 
Turkey has led to exploitation, and increase self-sufficiency 
of refugees. This aids in protecting the dignity of refugees, 
as well as helping to pave the way to more durable solutions.
Kuwaiti Refugees in the Gulf (1990–1991)
Yemen is the only country in the Arabian Peninsula that has 
ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, and Iraq had passed 
legislation to regulate the status of Palestinian refugees that 
sought refuge in Iraq in 1948.22 Yet the countries that make 
up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—
have not passed any formal refugee laws.23 Indeed, for this 
reason, it is difficult to know how many de facto refugees 
reside or have been granted leave to stay in these states under 
alternative arrangements, such as residency or work visas.24
In August 1990, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded the 
neighbouring country of Kuwait. This caused the fleeing of 
hundreds of thousands of people who were living in Kuwait, 
both citizens and residents, such as Iraqis and Palestinians,25 
as well as Bidoon (stateless Kuwaitis). More than 1.5 mil-
lion people fled Iraq, Kuwait, and other Gulf countries, 
including some 700,000 Egyptians, 250,000 Palestinians or 
Jordanians,26 and more than 350,000 Asians, most of them 
from India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Phil-
ippines.27 Between 300,000 and 400,000 Kuwaitis became 
refugees,28 mostly in the neighbouring countries. The focus 
here will be on the treatment of Kuwaitis, since they had the 
benefit of being allowed to stay within the borders of neigh-
bouring Gulf states.
At least 200,000 of the Kuwaiti refugees sought refuge in 
Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi Kingdom sheltered the refugees 
in hotels and apartments, as well as provided food for them.29 
By late September 1990, approximately 35,000 Kuwaitis had 
fled to the UAE, who provided them with US$500 to begin 
their lives, as well as free housing, free schooling, and free 
health care.30 Smaller numbers fled to Bahrain and Qatar.31 It 
is also estimated that 40,000 Kuwaiti refugees took refuge in 
Iran, with the Kuwaiti government-in-exile setting up spe-
cial bureaus in three Iranian cities to look after the financial 
needs of their citizens.32
This “temporary regime” for Kuwaiti refugees does not appear 
to have been formalized, nor do there appear to have been laws 
or regulations passed to delineate the rights of Kuwaitis fleeing 
to Gulf countries, or minimum standards of treatment. Seeking 
refuge, however, was made easier by the fact that Kuwaiti citi-
zens, like other Gulf nationals, were and are allowed visa-free 
travel within the GCC, and freedom to work there.33 However, it 
appears that few Kuwaitis secured jobs, because it was unclear 
to employers whether they could depend on Kuwaitis to remain 
in the countries of refuge for the long term.34 Additionally, as 
shown above, the governments of the GCC countries provided 
generous assistance to these refugees, which made their de facto 
status different from that of other Gulf nationals. Moreover, it 
was intended to be temporary. Hessa al-Ossaify, the UAE infor-
mation minister at the time, responded to the question of the 
generosity of the UAE towards the Kuwaiti refugees: “We know 
they [the Kuwaitis] will be our guests for only a short time and 
we want to help, to show that they are our family.”35 Furthermore, 
the Gulf states did not shoulder the financial responsibility 
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themselves; the emir of Kuwait paid around US$500 million a 
month to sustain the Kuwaiti refugee population,36 many of 
whom were students without a source of income;37 indeed, the 
government-in-exile had announced in September 1990 that it 
would provide monthly allowances of up to US$320 for its citi-
zens living in exile.38
After the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, most 
Kuwaiti refugees returned to their homes.39 The return of 
the refugees was voluntary, with no Gulf state enforcing 
mandatory returns. However, it is unclear when the provi-
sion of free housing, schooling, and health care was ceased 
or reduced, if indeed it was, since most Kuwaitis had wanted 
to return home to rebuild their country.40
Bosnian Refugees in Germany (1992–1995)
The states that make up the European Union have all ratified 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, and some even have formal 
provisions for other forms of protection. Moreover, Euro-
pean Union Directive 2001/55/EC on Minimum Standards for 
Giving Temporary Protection41 provides for “a procedure of 
exceptional character” that gives “immediate and temporary 
protection.” In order to encourage return, status under the 
directive continues for one year and may be renewable for up 
to three years.42 However, it should be mentioned that the 
directive has not been implemented for a variety of reasons.43
Starting in 1992, shortly after Bosnia’s referendum for 
independence, Serbian forces from the former Yugoslavia 
began a campaign of war and ethnic cleansing, resulting in 
some 500,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina being 
displaced to every member state of the European Union—
and some non-member states.44 These states responded by 
implementing temporary protection measures and, at least 
initially, “avoiding grants of durable asylum.”45 Temporary 
protection was set up partly because the arrival of Bosnians 
was impossible to stop, and partly in response to appeals by 
the UNHCR and human rights organizations.46 The duration 
of these temporary protection regimes was to be subject to 
the satisfaction of certain “benchmarks” contained in the 
Repatriation Plan47 of the UNHCR.48
Germany had the largest Bosnian refugee population 
of 320,000,49 so their policies will be the main focus here. 
Moreover, in most countries where Bosnians fled, they were 
eventually granted permanent residence rights50—except 
for Germany. For example, Sweden, Norway, and Finland 
granted the majority of Bosnians permanent residence per-
mits on humanitarian grounds, while Denmark amended its 
initial temporary protection regulations to enable all Bos-
nians who had been resident in Denmark for two years to 
be given the same rights as other refugees; they eventually 
received permanent residence permits.51 On the other hand, 
Germany had not implemented any plans enabling Bosnians 
to apply to a more permanent status.52 Furthermore, by the 
end of 1996, Germany was the only European state to have 
initiated forced repatriation.53
Temporary protection for persons from Bosnia was based 
on a 22 May 1992 decision of the ministers of the interior 
and the federal government, which set out the principles for 
admission of persons from Bosnia Herzegovina and enacted a 
ban on the deportation of these persons to their country. The 
majority of Bosnians were given two main types of temporary 
permits, the Duldung (toleration permit) and Aufenthalts-
befugnis (short-term residence permit).54 The Aufenthalts-
befugnis—which was valid for one or two years—was given 
to ex-detainees and other vulnerable persons, as well as to 
medical evacuees.55 All other Bosnians were given the Dul-
dung—which had to be renewed every six months and could 
theoretically be renewed indefinitely56—and enabled them to 
stay in Germany until return/deportation was possible.57 
Holders of the Aufenthaltsbefugnis were in principle 
entitled to social aid on the same basis as German nationals, 
while persons with the Duldung fell in some federal states 
under the same regime applied to asylum seekers; this meant 
that assistance could be provided only in kind while a mon-
etary stipend was limited to DM80 per month per person.58 
After three months, those under temporary protection had 
access to schools at the primary and secondary level. Hold-
ers of either permit were allowed to work if no German or EU 
national could be employed. The rights afforded to holders 
of these permits are fewer than the rights enshrined under 
the Refugee Convention.59
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina was signed on 14 December 1995 and 
brought a formal end to the war. The UNHCR’s Repatriation 
Plan was adopted on 8 March 1996 and contained minimum 
standards for voluntary repatriation. By October 1996, Ger-
many insisted that temporary protection had to end and 
started forced repatriation.60 According to UNHCR, around 
100,000 Bosnians were repatriated from Germany in 1997,61 
and by March 2000 only 37,000 Bosnians remained in Ger-
many, many of them who had suffered traumatic ordeals dur-
ing the war.62 Over 92 per cent of the Bosnians who returned 
between 1997 and 1999 were from Germany.63 The return of 
the majority of Bosnians was despite the fact that, particu-
larly in the years immediately following the official end of 
the war, the minimum conditions for repatriation—that the 
refugees could return freely to their homes and under condi-
tions of safety—were not fulfilled.64 
Syrian Refugees in Turkey (2011–Present)
Between 1934 and 2006, Turkey’s Law No. 2510 on Settlement 
regulated the formal settlement of foreigners in Turkey, and 
from 1994 to 2014, Regulation No. 1994/6169.65 Article 3 of 
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Law No. 2510 defined refugees as those who came to Turkey 
for compelling reasons without the intention of permanent 
settlement; however, should they subsequently want to settle, 
article 4 bars “those who are not attached to Turkish culture” 
from settling permanently.66 Law No. 5543 of 2006, which 
replaced Law No. 2510 on Settlement, did not change this 
admission policy. According to article 4, those who are not 
of Turkish descent and culture are not eligible for settlement. 
Turkey is also party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Pro-
tocol, but it made a reservation to the 1967 Protocol that it 
would not remove the geographical limitation. This means 
that Syrian refugees, by virtue of not being from Europe, 
are not eligible to apply for refugee status under the 1951 
Convention in Turkey. However, under the Law on Foreign-
ers and International Protection (2013—to be discussed in 
further detail below), non-European refugees are granted a 
limited form of protection—so-called conditional refugee 
status—which allows them to stay in Turkey until a long-
term place of settlement outside Turkey is found for them or 
until they can return.67
The crisis in Syria began in March 2011 as a peaceful pro-
test against the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. 
However, the conflict escalated and by mid-2012 larger 
numbers of people fled the war to neighbouring countries. 
In May 2011 the first camps for Syrian refugees opened in 
Turkey.68 As of July 2017, there were over three million Syr-
ian refugees in Turkey, and Turkey is currently the world’s 
largest refugee-hosting country.69
In October 2011 the Turkish government introduced a 
temporary protection regime for all Syrians, Palestinian 
refugees, and stateless persons living in Syria who arrived in 
Turkey to seek refuge.70 At this time, there were few details 
given about the nature of this temporary protection regime. 
For the most part, particularly initially, Turkey maintained 
an open-door policy with Syria,71 and thus many refugees 
fleeing Syria were able to enter into Turkey. The Turkish gov-
ernment took responsibility for the refugees, and the UNHCR 
provided services through the Turkish government—it was 
not allowed to undertake RSD because Turkey did not con-
sider them “refugees” within the meaning of the 1951 Con-
vention.72 As more refugees arrived in Turkey, the Turkish 
government clarified the temporary protection regime and 
adopted formal regulation regarding refugees from Syria.
Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection 
of April 2013, states in article 91 under provisional article 1,
The citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, stateless persons and 
refugees who have arrived at or crossed our borders coming from 
Syrian Arab Republic as part of a mass influx or individually for 
temporary protection purposes due to the events that have taken 
place in Syrian Arab Republic since 28 April 2011 shall be covered 
under temporary protection, even if they have filed an application 
for international protection. Individual applications for interna-
tional protection shall not be processed during the implementation 
of temporary protection.73
This article also states, “Proceedings to be followed on 
reception into, stay in, rights and obligations in, exit from 
Turkey of such persons, along with measures to be taken 
against mass movements … shall be governed by a regula-
tion to be issued by the Council of Ministers.”74
In October 2014 the Turkish Council of Ministers 
adopted Regulation No. 29153 on temporary protection (the 
2014 Regulation), which established “rules on registration 
and documentation procedures to be followed by tempo-
rarily protected persons, introduces a clear right to stay in 
Turkey until the temporary protection regime is over, and 
clarifies the set of rights and entitlements for the temporary 
protection beneficiaries.”75 According to article 10 of the 
2014 Regulation, the Council of Ministers has the power 
to set a maximum time limit, but the regulation does not 
oblige them to do so.76 Article 38 of the 2014 Regulations 
provides temporary protection beneficiaries with access to 
shelter, food, health care, social assistance, education, and 
other services within temporary accommodation centres.77 
However, non-camp refugees constitute almost 88 per cent 
of all the Syrian refugee population in Turkey, and there are 
reports that their access to these services is uneven.78
More than seven years into the crisis, there are some 
downfalls to and gaps in the 2014 Regulation. There is no 
explicit right to work, education, and social assistance for 
Syrians.79 Even with education, accessing schools can be 
more difficult because “the everyday realities of Syrian fami-
lies in the face of poverty, where families cannot afford to 
clothe and pay for the transportation costs of sending their 
children to school.”80
Moreover, while Syrians who hold temporary protection 
beneficiary identity cards can apply for work permits under 
article 29(2), the access was to be determined later by the 
Council of Ministers.81 In this regard, two regulations were 
passed in 2016; the first, on 15 January 2016, gave registered 
Syrian refugees living in Turkey for more than six months 
the ability to apply for a work permit in the province where 
they first registered. The limitations of this law are that 
that the individual’s work permit is tied to a single place of 
employment, making it difficult or inconvenient to transfer, 
and that the proportion of refugees and asylum seekers can-
not exceed 10 per cent of a company’s workforce.82 The sec-
ond regulation, passed on 26 April 2016, gave the prospective 
employer the responsibility of submitting applications for 
work permits to the Ministry of Labour and Social Securi-
ty.83 However, it appears that many employers are unwilling 
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to comply with the regulations, which require them to pay 
the Syrian employees minimum wage; for some, the reason 
for employing Syrian refugees is precisely because they are 
easily exploited.84 While Turkish law imposes heavy fines 
for employing individuals without work permits, employers 
seem not to be discouraged.85 The longer the Syrian con-
flict continues, the more likely it will be that illegal labour 
will increase, unless the Turkish government finds a way to 
ensure that employers apply for work permits for the refu-
gees. In the meantime, beneficiaries of temporary protection 
are more susceptible to exploitation and trafficking, as well 
as resentment from the host population, since employers 
have a “cheaper” option. 
More refugees are pouring into Turkey, with greater 
numbers making the dangerous journey to Europe by boat; 
indeed, in 2015 alone, more than one million people arrived 
in the EU, around 885,000 of them through Greece.86 The 
city of İzmir has become a transit city for those wanting to 
cross into Europe via Greece. In 2015 over 91,000 people 
were apprehended or rescued at sea by Turkish authorities in 
the Aegean Sea.87 To respond to these growing numbers, in 
November 2015 the EU and Turkey agreed on the EU-Turkey 
Joint Action Plan, which was followed by the EU-Turkey 
statement (also known as the EU-Turkey Deal) on 8 March 
2016. The EU-Turkey Deal stipulated that all new irregular 
migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 
March 2016 would be returned to Turkey, and the EU would 
give Turkey €3 billion to support Syrians in Turkey, as well as 
give them legal pathways to seek asylum in Europe. Refugees 
who managed to arrive at one of the Greek islands would be 
put under an admissibility procedure to determine whether 
Turkey is a safe country for them to be returned to; if it is 
deemed that Turkey is safe, then the refugees are returned, 
and if it is deemed that Turkey is not safe, then the asylum 
seeker must proceed with the eligibility requirements in 
order to qualify for protection. There are exceptions made for 
vulnerable categories of people, who are permitted to make 
their asylum claim in Greece without going through the 
admissibility interview. Indeed, it seems that the EU-Turkey 
Deal has helped to curb the flow of refugees into Europe; 
according to the European Commission, from 10,000 in one 
day in October 2015 to an average of around 43 per day in 
March 2017, while the number of deaths at sea decreased 
from 1,145 in the year before the EU-Turkey Deal to 80 in the 
year that followed.88 The Greek Council of State decided on 
22 September 2017 that Turkey is a safe third country for two 
Syrians (cases 2348/2017 and 2348/2017).
What Works?
As can be seen, temporary protection of refugees as a formal 
status gained prominence during the 1990s as a response to 
forced migration, particularly due to the Bosnian and Koso-
var refugee crises.89 However, temporary protection has been 
criticized as an attempt to de-legalize refugee protection by 
placing it within the executive power of the state, rather than 
allowing it to remain subject to legal interpretation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention.90 Yet even refugee advocates recognize 
that informal protection can serve humanitarian objec-
tives91 and enables persons who fall outside the convention’s 
definition to receive international protection. Thus, in asking, 
“What works?,” we need to be clear about the objectives of tem-
porary protection for the purposes of this article: namely the 
protection of large influxes of refugees until they can be safe 
to return, guaranteeing their human rights, as well as increas-
ing protection and integration in cases of protracted conflicts 
to ensure that refugees can live in dignity.
Short-Term Humanitarian Aid and Support
In the Gulf case, the refugees were given shelter in private 
accommodation, as well as access to education. The Kuwaiti 
refugees, rarely discussed in those terms in academic lit-
erature, were perhaps the most “privileged” of the cases 
discussed in this article, with a wealthy government that 
could support them in exile, and a relatively swift return. 
Other factors contributed to the “success” of these tempo-
rary protection measures: the wealth of neighbouring coun-
tries, the shared cultural and linguistic ties, the relatively 
small numbers of refugees, the lack of historical grievances 
between Gulf states (at the time), and the support of Gulf 
countries for Kuwait and its people during the war. In this 
case, the circumstances were quite exceptional and difficult 
to replicate. Nevertheless, providing Kuwaitis with access to 
neighbouring states, shelter, and a stipend enabled them to 
live relatively normally in the months of the war. After seven 
months, their country was liberated, and it was safe for them 
to return. 
In Germany many Bosnians lived in collective accom-
modation centres, while many others were privately accom-
modated. Recipients of temporary protection were allowed 
assistance in kind with a modest monthly stipend. For the 
first three months, while they were staying in receptions cen-
tres, access to schools for children of asylum seekers was not 
guaranteed in all federal states. However, after three months, 
children of those receiving temporary protection had access 
to primary and secondary schooling. For the short term—
a few months—these measures may be seen to be suited to 
large numbers of people fleeing and ensure that the national 
refugee system is not overwhelmed.
In the first year of the Syrian war, Turkey’s measures were 
commendable and were in compliance with minimum inter-
national standards: no forcible return, no individual status 
determination, as well as accommodation and provision 
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of basic services in camps. The camps were also deemed of 
acceptable standard; Turkey’s Ministry of Education opened 
schools within the camps, and those living in the camps were 
given access to health care in Turkish hospitals.92 
While the examples above show that these countries were 
prepared and able to provide truly “temporary” and short-term 
protection, the real problems emerge when the refugee crisis lasts 
several years, with increasing numbers of people seeking refuge.
Integration and Access to Employment and Services after 
Prolonged Stay
Some scholars suggest that where refugees enjoy rights and 
expect to be able to obtain citizenship rights, irrespective of 
whether or not they are naturalized, they tend to remain in 
host countries “regardless of whether the factors that prompt 
displacement are eliminated.”93 This seems, of course, to be con-
trary to the term temporary protection and not what many host 
countries have in mind. However, this is not necessarily true, 
nor, even if it is true for some cases, does it need to be negative. 
For Kuwaiti refugees, by virtue of being GCC citizens, they 
were already “integrated” in that they had the freedom to 
work if they wanted to and were given free access to gov-
ernment schools and other government services. While 
most Kuwaitis did not get jobs, had the war continued for 
another year or two, it can be assumed that they would have 
had to, as it is difficult to know whether Kuwaiti refugees 
would have continued to receive assistance from supporting 
governments (the host government as well as their govern-
ment-in-exile) had the war been prolonged. The main point 
to consider is that close to all Kuwaiti refugees returned after 
the war, despite being well integrated into the host societies. 
Indeed the factor that may most influence the decision of 
refugees not to return to their homes of origin is economic 
consideration, and whether they would be able to survive 
and thrive once they return.94 On 20 April 1991 the first 
post-liberation government was formed with the objective 
of “restoring daily life and developing a program leading 
up to national assembly elections scheduled for 5 October 
1992.”95 This, as well as high nationalist feelings, ensured that 
most Kuwaitis returned home. 
Of course some conflicts remain protracted, and recipi-
ents of temporary protection may remain for years in the 
host countries. In the case of Germany, it was the only EU 
country in 1997 that forcibly returned persons to areas where 
they may form ethnic minorities, in opposition to UNHCR 
guidelines, meaning that return was often under conditions 
in which security could not be guaranteed.96 The types of 
documents the Bosnian refugees had determined their 
access to services in Germany. The majority of Bosnians 
were not provided access to language lessons, family unifi-
cation, or travel documents; work permits were given only 
for a specific job for which no Germans or EU citizens were 
available. In the rest of Europe, the integration solution for 
Bosnians was mainly contingent on their positive impact 
upon labour markets and the relative ease of their cultural 
assimilation.97 The countries naturalizing Bosnians consid-
ered those who had “regular employment, or private accom-
modation, and/or had not been convicted of a crime in the 
host country.”98
 Recipients of temporary protection, if given legal chan-
nels to do so, can become integrated, productive, and self-
reliant. Indeed, without “a comprehensive integration policy 
including an employment strategy, the risk for social exclu-
sion and rising xenophobia [increases] in the host society.”99 
As the Syrian crisis enters its seventh year and refugees’ stay 
in Turkey is prolonged, discontent is increasing within Turk-
ish society.100 One of the reasons, as mentioned above, is 
their provision of cheap labour, and the barriers to accessing 
the labour market legally (such as requiring employers to 
apply for a work permit). Another reason, however, is their 
large number, which creates fear among the local population 
that the refugees are a burden on national resources, and 
that they would have to compete with them for jobs. One 
suggested solution to this problem is to give the government 
the right to regulate “the competition Syrians may create 
in the labor market,”101 which is what the new employment 
laws have set out to do. This is a good first step but must be 
enforced in order to ensure that Syrians are not exploited. 
Long-term Cooperation and Shared Responsibility
The previous points speak to the short and medium term of 
a conflict, and some positive and negative examples of tem-
porary protection. In order to ensure that temporary protec-
tion of refugees is truly successful, I suggest that there must 
be regional as well as international harmonization of long-
term outlooks when the temporary turns into a protracted 
situation.102 When a situation that was meant to be “tem-
porary” is prolonged, states may have to consider long-term 
or even permanent stay through citizenship or some form 
of permanent residence.103 States are apprehensive about 
this possibility, particularly because during mass influxes of 
people, some states shoulder more responsibility than others, 
with resulting implications for national resources and capac-
ity. With Bosnian refugees in Europe, three countries—Ger-
many (59 per cent), Austria, and Sweden—received 89 per 
cent of all Bosnians.104 In the Syrian case, as of June 2017, 
out of an approximate 5 million registered Syrian refugees, 
around 3.5 million are in Turkey (60 per cent), while almost 
1 million are in Lebanon (20 per cent)—meaning that 80 per 
cent of refugees are in just two countries—and over 650,000 
in Jordan, almost 250,000 in Iraq, and almost 130,000 in 
Egypt,105 whose capacities are already stretched. During the 
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Bosnian crisis, a reason why the UNHCR accepted the com-
promise of “temporary protection” was that it was believed 
that it would encourage more EU countries to accept those 
who were fleeing ethnic cleansing.106 However, this proved 
not to be the case and may explain why Germany is the only 
country to have embarked upon mandatory repatriation.
In the Gulf it is unclear whether Kuwaiti refugees would 
have been allowed to naturalize; while Gulf states are notori-
ous for their restrictive nationality laws,107 Kuwaiti citizens 
could have been an exception, as they also benefit from 
preferential treatment as Gulf nationals. At the same time, 
Gulf (and most Arab) states in general have refused to natu-
ralize Palestinian refugees on the premise that they would 
lose their right to return, so Gulf countries could have taken 
the same route regarding Kuwaiti refugees, fearing that natu-
ralizing them would mean that they would not return. At 
this point, however, this is mere speculation. The important 
point is that the Kuwaiti refugees had the main freedoms 
that allow for successful integration: freedom of movement, 
work, and residence; the right of ownership, inheritance, and 
bequest; and the freedom of exercising economic activity.108 
Their smaller numbers in each of the Gulf states also means 
that their permanent integration would have been easier; 
indeed, the largest country in the GCC—Saudi—with exten-
sive resources had the largest number of Kuwaiti refugees 
(200,000), followed by the UAE, followed by the smaller GCC 
states. It appears that the numbers of refugees in each state 
were proportional to that state’s size and population. However, 
the Kuwaiti refugees in the Gulf are an exception because 
of all the points mentioned previously (wealth, cooperation, 
cultural and linguistic ties, etc), so the relative “success” of 
the measures taken at the time cannot be used as a blanket 
standard to apply. However, the freedoms mentioned are 
indeed useful as a model for incremental integration.
One suggestion would be that, in the event of a large 
refugee crisis that has continued for over a year, the UN or 
regional bodies (such as the EU) directly tackle the issue of 
shared responsibility, ensuring that a group of countries 
takes in refugees under temporary protection proportional 
to their population and resources. As within their sovereign 
right, states may decide whether or not to eventually natu-
ralize the refugees, but the manageable size of the refugee 
population would make it easier for those states to extend 
certain rights necessary for to integrate refugees and avoid 
resentment among the local population. This has been the 
case for the European countries that eventually naturalized 
Bosnian refugees. The problem Turkey is facing now, for 
example, is that they host the vast majority of all Syrian refu-
gees. Language barriers, the large number of urban refugees, 
and restrictive employment laws, which lead to illegal labour, 
also cause resentment with the host population, and so the 
government must take extra measures to balance increasing 
xenophobia with the needs of a large number of refugees. 
Turkey amended its citizenship law in April 2018, making 
some Syrians eligible for citizenship (for example, one con-
dition is that the applicant should be residing in Turkey for 
at least five years, which most Syrian refugees have been, yet 
they should also “have an income or profession to provide 
for his own livelihood and those of his/her dependents in 
Turkey,” which most do not).109 
Yet with a system in place to more equitably manage the 
proportion of refugees taken in host states, the hope is that 
it would be easier to extend rights to recipients of temporary 
protection. Getting countries to agree to numbers would be a 
great feat, and the reality is that many countries avoid accept-
ing large numbers of temporary refugees unless they are forced 
to by circumstance. However, many asylum seekers are using 
Turkey as a transit point to go to the European Union; indeed, 
the EU-Turkey Deal was meant to curb this by supplying Tur-
key with monetary resources to better manage the refugees, 
as well as allow these refugees a legal route to EU asylum via 
resettlement.110 In theory, this is a good step, although it should 
be mentioned that there is much criticism of the EU-Turkey 
Deal and it still keeps most refugees in Turkey.111 The point is 
that states must negotiate hosting refugees when conflicts are 
prolonged, to more equitably share responsibility for refugees. 
Otherwise, refugees themselves will attempt to move on from 
countries of first arrival, as they have been, resulting in the rise 
of smuggling rings and exposure to further danger.112
Conclusion
Temporary protection seems to be a widely acceptable solu-
tion by many states for large influxes of refugees, particularly 
when it is difficult to undertake individual RSD and when 
states are reluctant to open their doors to large numbers of 
refugees. While many temporary protection measures are 
sufficient when the crisis is truly temporary and short term, 
problems arise when the causes of displacement are more 
extended. Thus there is something to learn from the posi-
tive aspects of past temporary protection regimes in order 
to apply today.
The example of Kuwaiti refugees in the Gulf, as well as 
Bosnian refugees in European countries other than Ger-
many, showed that where numbers are manageable and refu-
gees are given legal channels to work, this benefits the host 
community as well as the refugees. The problem that Tur-
key faces now is the high number of refugees and the issue 
of accessible and legal work. A possible solution is greater 
responsibility sharing between states for refugees so that no 
single state is over-capacitated, making the numbers more 
manageable and thereby enabling host governments to pro-
vide an incrementally more favourable situation for refugees. 
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